Модели и методы анализа распределения влияния в выборных органах с ограничениями на формирование коалиций
![Диссертация: Модели и методы анализа распределения влияния в выборных органах с ограничениями на формирование коалиций](https://westud.ru/work/2519096/cover.png)
Диссертация
Особый интерес вызывает ситуация, когда возможны коалиции не всех партий, составляющих выборный орган. Рассмотрим пример. Пусть в парламенте присутствуют три партии А, В и С, с голосами 50, 49 и 1 соответственно. Пусть для принятия решения требуется 51 голос (простое большинство). Пусть, кроме того, партии, А и В не могут вступать вместе в коалиции. Тогда существует только одна выигрывающая… Читать ещё >
Содержание
- Глава 1. Индексы влияния и их применение
- 1. 1. Подходы к измерению влияния участников в выборных органах
- 1. 2. Модель распределения влияния при ограничениях на формирование коалиций
- 1. 2. 1. Простая игра с ограничениями
- 1. 2. 2. Игра взвешенного голосования с ограничениями
- 1. 2. 3. Метод производящих функций для бинарных ограничений
- 1. 2. 4. Метод производящих функций для тернарных ограничений
- 2. 1. Принятие решений в Европейском Союзе: Совет Министров и Европейский парламент
- 2. 2. Распределение влияния в Совете Министров Европейского Союза
- 2. 3. Распределение влияния в Европейском парламенте
- 3. 1. Распределение влияния партий и депутатских групп без ограничений на возможности вступления в коалиции
- 3. 2. Распределение влияния партий и депутатских групп с ограничениями на возможности вступления в коалиции
- 3. 3. Распределение влияния фракций в Московской городской Думе
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- Д- индекс Банцафа игрока /-77, — число замен игрока /-